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"The danger to public policy arises from civilian authorities 
adopting the narrowness of outlook of professional soldiers --
an outlook restricted by training and experience to the use 
of force. As we have developed into a society whose prominent 
business is violence, one of the leading professions inevitably 
is soldiering. Since they are the professionals, and civilian 
bureaucrats refuse to challenge them, the military have become 
ardent and effective competitors for power in American society." 
Senator J.W. Fulbright, The Piatagon Propaganda Machine, p. 143. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Civilian control of the Pentagon has always been a controversial 
issue. Many military leaders have felt that this civilian leadership has stifled 
the efficiency of the defense establishment, while others have welcomed the support 
and guidance provided by their non-military counterparts. This article by Brooke 
Nihart, reprinted with the permission of the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL (January 1973), 
reports the current views of our civilian and military defense leaders. 
FEATURE: CIVILIAN CONTROL STILL AN ISSUE 
"WAR IS TOO IMPORTANT to be left to the generals," is how French Premier Georges 
Clemenceau phrased his view of civilian control aS lhe exercised it over his failing 
generals on the Western Front. In exclusive interviews with the top civilian and 
top military leader, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and JCS Chairman Admiral Thomas 
H. Moorer, they, in effect agreed. 
Civilian control has been virtually unquestioned in principle of practice in the 
185 years since the Constitution was framed. Lincoln exercised it fully during the 
Civil War and the voters rejected an 1864 presidential bid by MGen George McClellan 
which smacked to them of possible militarization of government. When West Pointers 
such as Grant and Eisenhower were elected to the presidency their personal control 
over governmental matters often seemed less than their civilian predecessors and the 
military hardly could be said to have thrived during those regimes. President Harry 
S. Truman showed he was boss when he relieved a recalcitrant General MacArthur. 
Admiral Moorer told AFJ recently, "I have never known anyone in uniform who did 
not clearly and fully support civilian control which is part and parcel of our whole 
system as set up by the Constitution." 
In an October letter to Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (concerning actions taken as a result of Hearings on the unauthorized 
air strikes against North Vietnam ordered by MGen John D. Lavelle), Secretary of 
Defense Melvin R. Laird said, "There is no evidence of a breakdown in or a threat to 
civilian control of the military." 
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In answer to a question during an interview on the present status of civilian 
control, Laird said, "I've watched it for about 20 years as a Congressman and Secretary 
of Defense. I do not have the concern I once had in this area. I think we have been 
able to improve civilian control. It is up to the Secretary of Defense and the 
President. It is their responsibility under the Contritution and the National Security 
Act to exercise that control." 
Despite such disclaimers, critics of the Pentagon show a lack of understanding of 
what civilian control is and how it is applied. The lack of understanding is compounded 
partly of misinformation ___ : and partly of frustration over 
a costly, unwon, and, to some, wrong war; to continued defense expenditures at what 
they feel is too high a level; and to in~ruatons into the civilian sector such as mi1it~~ 
investigations of civilians. The critics fail to realize that civilian authority 
insures neither liberty nor peace, viz., the civilian decision to oppose the invasion 
of North Vietnam; to continue high levels of defense spending to counteract the 
expansionist policies of Russia (meanwhile tasking the Army with aiding the surveillance 
of dissident activists); to pull the troops out of Vietnam; to cut defense spending in 
real dollars or purchasing power back to the 1950s $50-bi11ion-1eve1 (even with a 
price tag reading $80-bi11ion in inflated dollars); to order the Army to end surveillance 
of civilians. The critics' hang-up seems to be the nature of the military policy with 
which they disagree. They assume that it is. made by the military for the military without 
reference to civilian authority. Such is not the case, according to Laird and Moorer. 
WHO CONTROLS, WHO COMMANDS 
Admiral Moorer brought out forcibly that, "the duties of the Joint Chiefs are 
to provide direction to the Armed Forces and advice to the Secretary of Defense and the 
President. The Joint Chiefs do not make policy, do not approve budgets, do not issue 
directives to the mi1itarYi. forces without civilian approval. In fact, the law 
specifically states that the Joint Chiefs do not command and so you have, in that 
sense, civilian control. I think there is a distinction, too, between civilian control 
and civilian command. I think that command in the field should be by professionals ••• 
once one begins to execute a military operation today, when weapons are so complex and 
destructive, professionalism is required across the board." 
"Since I have been Chairman," Moorer said, "and the same thing applied during General 
Wheeler's time and I'm sure before him, a directive has never left this building 
requiring combat action on the part of u.S. forces that was not initialed by the 
Secretary of Defense. I testified to this before the Congress and I can document it." 
Emphasizing the close control he has over operations, Secretary Laird said he approves 
all ship movements himself. "I assign and word every operating authority," he said. 
Operating authorities are the orders to the field initiating operations and setting 
their limits. Laird feels that with the newly instituted Unified Command inspector 
general system he can quickly and accurately verify their execution. 
The new, not-yet-appointed, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Operations) will be used 
to monitor these operational matteris, Laird said. "Take the movement of ships, I 
approve those myself, now. I know and approve every ship on the line now and the changes 
that will be made tomorrow. I wathc those things; that's what keeps you up at night 
getting night telephone calls. It would be helpful to have someone like the new 
Deputy Secretary to help in that area." ..) 
"We do not expect our civilian superiors to accept our advice," Admiral Moorer told 
AFJ, "but we do have a right to expect them to listen to it." And the civilians do 
listen, according to Secretary Laird. Asked what advice he would give to a new civilian 
subordinate in this regard, Laird said he would tell him that the best advice and best 
leadership is represented in the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, and that their 
recommendations must be considered. Laird agreed that the Joint Chiefs accept decisions 
better when they have had an opportunity to present their case and make recommendations. 
"They know they can walk into this office any time," Laird emphasized, "They don't have 
to have an appointment or anything else; they know they always have free access to me 
and their Service Secretaries." 
We asked Admiral Moorer what instructions he might give a senior officer on how to 
interact better with civilian leadership to make civilian control more effective and 
make military participation in the interaction more productive. He said he would tell 
them, "to communicate with the civilians and to give advice freely but when the decision 
was made, don't try to undercut it ••• you should either support it or get out, but don't 
you undercut it by slipping around to the back door and leaking the disagreement to 
somebody to publicize it." 
" 
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Laird, who reversed .the policies of his predecessors by listening more to military 
advice in what he calls "participatory management," said that one thing he would advise 
new civilian officials to do to continue the effectiveness of civilian control would 
be to give the military, "An understanding of what the fiscal restraints are so that 
they will try to assign some priorities on the basis of their best military judgment. 
That gives them a greater input into their programs than they have ever had before. For-
merly, when they were told there were no restraints at all the impact of their 
recommendations becomes very small but if they are given various ranges of fiscal 
constraints within the department then the impact of their recommendations takes on 
greater si~nificaneebut you are also able to have better military judgment and better 
military advice that way. And they feel they can see the significance of their 
t~~commendations and you don't have some other civilian shop such as Systems Analysis 
making the decision for them. I get the best kind of military advice that way." 
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of two years back recommended a second Deputy 
Secretary of Defense be appointed to oversee operations. Congress, this past year, 
authorized the pmst. As a result of the Lavelle case, Laird set up an inspector 
general system within the unified commands to check on operations. Previously, only the 
Services had an inspector general system which was concerned with internal matters, 
mainly administration and discipline. We asked Laird about both the new deputy and the 
new IG. 
Laird's answer to what sort of man he had recommended for the deputy's job suggested 
that he was a current insider with Pentagon experience. Laird said' "He has to be someone 
who understands how the Services operate because you have to be tough in the minds of 
anyone that they are responsible to you all the way down the line." He said the 
decision would be made "within the next couple of weeks" which put it just before 
Christmas. However, he pointed out that his successor, Elliot Richardson, "may not 
divide the responsibility (one deputy for operations and one for administration and 
procurement) as I would." 
Referring to the Lavelle case again, Laird said; "I believe that I was let down a 
bit and I want to make sure that there is an investigative machinery set up that is 
more adequate than the present (Service IG) investigative machinery." Laird's response 
has been to set up an IG on the staff of all unified commanders, "with responsibility 
to inspect Service component commands on military operational matters, particularly as 
they involve command and control, and to report to the Secretary of Defense through the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff," as he wrote to Senator Stennis. Laird said that reports are 
coming in to him now but that the new Secretary of Defense may do it differently. 
"Orders have gone out and it is in effect," Laird said of the new IG system. "I can 
quickly verify every operating authority and directive now," he added. 
Asked how the new IG reporting system would work, Admiral Moorer said that reports 
would come into the JCS, " ••• if the problem is one of even the remotest interest to the 
Secretary of Defense, he'll know about it. The JCS will not only give him the report 
and our opinion as to its validity but we will give him our recommendation as to what 
corrective measures to take. That's the normal way we operate. If the Secretary wants 
an inspection made or a report on a certain subject, he instructs us and it gets done, 
that's all." 
POLITICIAN OR MANAGER? 
The phenomonen of the past four years has been the willing acceptance of Laird's 
leadership by the Services. A phenomonen because it has been an era of drastically 
reduced budgets and manpower which in the past has resulted in wails of anguish and 
"end runs" to Congress to get appropriations denied them by the Secretary. The 
stewardship of Laird, the warm, human, wise politician, has been in marked contrast 
to the longer regime of his predecessor Robert S. McNamara, the cold, efficient, man-
ager. McNamara presided in an era of expanding defense budgets and manpower yet by 
his "overcontrol" of the Services and disregard for their professional advice managed 
to make them hate every minute of it. 
Because of the difference between the two approaches to civilian control-one that 
misused it badly and the other that made it effective-we asked Secretary Laird whether 
he thought that a person with a political background was more fitted for the post than 
one with a managerial or academic career. He said that four years ago, "I did suggest 
that because of the problems this Department was going to have, not only as to public 
acceptability but also as to congressional concern, the President should have someone who 
had had a background in Congress . And that is why I suggested Scoop Jackson (Senator 
" .. 
Henry Jackson). He backed out at the last minute and I kind of got trapped ••• that is 
not the right word," Laird laughed. I got involved and left Congress to do this job. 
I do think my political background helped but what helped me the most was listening to 
Defense Budget hearings for 16 years on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee." 
We asked Admiral Moorer which type of Secretary he though was best for the exercise 
of civilian control. He said the Secreatry, "in a broad sense must understand the 
interplay between political and military actions; he must understand the goals set 
by the President as Commander in Chief. I think that it would be difficult for me to 
say that one individual by virture of his background would be better in this role 
than another. I think it depends on an individual's basic intelligence, it depends a 
hell of a lot on his energy and his willingness to dig out the facts and keep abreast." C; 
In concluding the interview Admiral Moorer pointed out that a vital corollary to 
civilian control is military professionalism. "We must rely on our Constitutional 
system and the good judgment of elected civilian officials to keep us free," he said. 
"If this democracy is to get the protection it expects from its military establishment 
it must receive sound and clear military advice and the execution of the most professional 
manner possible. The tremendous power of destruction of modern weapons allow no other 
course," he said. 
"Without this professionalism, which I think we definitely have today," Moorer 
continued, "the military cannot effectively respond to civilian contro1." Admiral 
Moorer then pointed out that professionalism is not an automatic attribute granted to 
the Armed Forces. Among other factors, it depends on pride and discipline. And 
professionalism as well as pride and discipline can slip away if we, the American 
people, are not sufficiently concerned. They can only be maintained through the 
support of the American people." 
Moorer said that the Services can and do instill pride in their men and maintain 
discipline. He emphasized in conclusion, however, "that pride will not long be an 
outstanding characterisitc of our Armed Forces if service in them is not looked upon 
with pride and respect by our people. Discipline will not be maintained in our 
Armed Forces if our citizens encourage desertion and acts of disobedience on the 
part of our military men and women. All can't serve in uniform but those who do not 
desire to do so must consider their obligations as citizens to support those who do 
serve even if it is only by passing a word of encouragement to the servicemen and 
women he meets." 
"I'll say once again," he ended, "there is no question but that everyone in uniform 
completely supports the concept of civilian control. I've never heard anyone express 
otherwise and I think our system provides for complete civil contro1." " 
FEATURE: MERCHANT FLEETS: NIXON LAGS ON '68 PROMISE 
IN SEPTEMBER 1968 presidential candidate Richard M. Mixon promised, in a speech in 
Seattle, to support a major shipbuilding program to increase the share of U.S. trade 
carried by American flagships from what was then a 5.6% rate to a rate of "over 30%" 
by the mid-seventies. 
In mid-~Ech 1972 U.S. Maritime Administrator Andrew Gibson told Congress the 
percentage of U.S. cargo carried in U.S. bottoms had declined to a low of 4.2% in 1969, ~ 
but since then had crawled back up to a 5.5% rate in 1971. 
The "Nixon Maritime Program for the Seventies" is obviously lagging, but Gibson 
indicated there will be a speed-up in the next several years. Construction was initiated 
on 12 new U.S. merchant vessels and 11 conversions in FY 71, an estimated 27 starts will 
be made in FY 72, and 16 new ships, plus an unspecified number of conversions, are 
planned for FY 73, Gibson told Congress in requesting $250-million in ship construction 
subsidies for the next fiscal year. 
Among other starts in the FY 73 program originally planned, according to Maritime 
Administration officials, are to roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ships, one barge ship (LASH), 
three shell tankers, four very large crude carriers (VLCC) of 250,000 deadweight tons 
(DWT) each, four liquid natural gas (LNG) ships, one sealand containership, and two 
conversions. 
Additional ships may be built under MSC (Military Sealift Command) auspices. MSC 
is planning construction of nine 25,000 ton-tankers under a "charter and build" plan, 
which involves no DoD money for ship construction. MSC also has been seeking a green 
light for construction of MPS (Multi-Purpose Ships) or MMS (Multi-Mission Ships) vessels 
to augment its dwindling in-house fleet, but reportedly may be willing to settle, in 
extremis, for a few LASH, Ro-Ro, and containerships of its own. 
